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30 September 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY


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30 September 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The heavy fighting between multibattalion Vietnamese government and Viet Cong forces along a hotly contested stretch of National Route 1, northwest of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province, apparently has terminated.

However, unconfirmed press reports state that the Viet Cong, by sabotaging bridges and setting up roadblocks along Route 1, have effectively isolated the district towns of Phu Cat, Phụ My, and Bong Son.


Two, possibly three, enemy regiments—including elements of the North Vietnamese (PAVN) 325th Division—and two additional battalions have been reported in Binh Dinh Province, either in the general area of the fighting near the Phu Cu pass, or within range. At least two other Viet Cong regiments and elements of a PAVN regiment are considered potentially available as reinforcements from adjacent provinces.

In Go Cong Province, 25 miles south of Saigon, a Communist force of undetermined strength on 28 September attacked and overran the defensive positions of a regular Vietnamese army company and a nearby paramilitary outpost, according to a delayed report. The losses of the combined government forces were nine killed, 22 wounded, and four troops missing. The friendly positions have been recovered by a government reaction force, which encountered no enemy resistance.

Communist Political Developments: Two top Chinese Communist officials reiterated Peking's tough position on Vietnam on 28 and 29 September. At a banquet honoring

visiting Cambodian Chief of State Sihanouk in Peking on the 28th, Chinese President Liu Shao-chi praised the Cambodian leader's public statements attacking US offers of unconditional discussions. Liu also attacked the USSR's attitude toward negotiations, declaring that "some people" are giving covert support to the US "peace talks scheme" in an attempt to induce the Vietnamese people "to capitulate."

Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi at a press conference in Peking the next day used that forum to defy both the US and the USSR, possibly to bolster morale in Hanoi. Chen reportedly shouted that he hoped US troops would invade China "tomorrow" so that the Chinese could wipe them out. Chen went on to invite the Indians and British to join in the attack and declared that a few million "puppet" troops would not be enough even if the "revisionist leaders in the north combine with them."



30 Sep 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

*India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Ayub Khan's attitude toward the United States appears to be toughening. At the same time, alleged cease-fire violations and rising tempers on both sides threaten the renewal of wider hostilities.

Ambassador McConaughy believes that the next six to eight weeks could determine whether Pakistan stays with the West.

In a meeting yesterday with Ambassador McConaughy, Ayub went out of his way to chide the United States. He said that it was "a great misfortune" that Pakistani efforts to keep the Chinese Communists out of the undeclared war had met with something akin to "bullying" rather than words of appreciation. Ayub claimed that "solemn US pledges" to Pakistan had been "almost revoked." He also criticized US policy in Vietnam and even the Alliance for Progress.

The Ambassador speculates that Ayub apparently sees India's cease-fire violations as a deliberate effort to prevent negotiations on Kashmir. Further, Ayub is worried about Pakistani reaction to a failure to achieve any progress toward a Kashmir settlement and he fears that renewed hostilities may force Pakistan to ask Peking for help.

Ayub is extremely suspicious of US activities with regard to his problems, and may even imagine that the US is plotting his ouster. The temporary absence of Finance Minister Shoaib--a pro-American moderate-may have contributed to his suspicions by allowing "hard liners" to exert more influence on Ayub.

the Indian military command in the Chhamb area of Kashmir has issued an ultimatum to the Pakistani forces there to withdraw or be attacked. The Pakistanis claim that they will use "all appropriate force" including planes if necessary to resist such an

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attack. The penetration at Chhamb is Pakistan's most important incursion into Indian-controlled territory in any area.

The British high commissioner in Pakistan reports that the commander of the UN team in Rawalpindi believes that India has been chiefly responsible for cease-fire violations so far. The UN observer also noted that the Pakistani army was cooperating fully with UNIPOM, the observer group assigned to the Punjab front, and seemed anxious for it to start operating.

The Pakistanis have complained about the UN's failure to investigate cease-fire violations in Kashmir and have specifically requested UN observers to overfly the sector northwest of Chhamb to inspect the line of control which they claim India is violating.

The commanding general of India's forces in eastern India has told the US Consul General in Calcutta that the cease-fire is being strained to its utmost limit by violations. General Manekshaw stated that renewed fighting would be bloodier than before in the west, but that it would not extend eastward to Bengal unless the Pakistanis provoked it. He remarked that the need to defend the Ladakh area of northeast Kashmir from the continuing Chinese Communist military threat prevents India from agreeing to give Pakistan any part of the Vale of Kashmir.

The general, however, does not believe that the Chinese Communists are preparing a massive attack on India. He remarked that they would have to move before 10 October, when weather conditions would preclude a major offensive. He also considers it unlikely that Pakistan has concluded a binding arrangement with the Chinese and feels that Ayub's agreement to a cease-fire supports this belief.

Rhodesia-UK: Upcoming talks in London between Prime Ministers Ian Smith and Harold Wilson almost certainly will determine Salisbury's course in its urgent bid for independence under white minority rule.

Smith intends to arrive in London on 4 October for preliminary talks and expects to meet with Wilson three days later. Rhodesian domestic and party pressures on Smith to obtain independence now appear to be at an all time high and his maneuverability is severely restricted.

The Wilson government is pledged to bar independence without assurance of speedy progress toward rule by the African majority.

British officials are pessimistic over reaching an agreement with Smith and privately feel that chances are high that Salisbury will unilaterally declare its independence. In his confrontation with Smith, Wilson is expected to outline the economic and political measures which his government proposes to take against an "illegal rebellion against the crown."

London, however, apparently has not yet decided whether sanctions would include measures such as a total ban on tobacco which would upset Britain's trade with Rhodesia. Britain would lose the advantages of its favorable trade balance with Salisbury at a time when it is struggling to correct a serious deficit in its over-all balance of payments. On the other hand, failure to impose sanctions would provoke a strong reaction from African Commonwealth members, possibly including withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

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Egypt: President Nasir is reshuffling his cabinet in an apparent effort to infuse new life into his regime, but no significant policy changes are likely to result.

The Cairo press yesterday announced the resignation of Premier Ali Sabri and his cabinet as a long-awaited move clearing the way for Nasir's plan to initiate a new era in which "revolutionary forces" would be reinvigorated.

Add as last sentence of second para:

Vice President Zakariya Muhyi-al-Din subsequently was directed by Nasir to head a new cabinet, which is to assume office on 2 October.




Uruguay: A new wave of strikes, evident frustration within the government, and generally deteriorating economic conditions have given rise to a new spate of coup rumors.

A 72-hour strike recently disrupted public services in Montevideo when municipal employees walked off the job, and a 48-hour strike in autonomous government enterprises began on 28 September. The government banks, including the central bank, have closed their doors rather than give in to employee demands for a 50-percent salary increase. The bankers have offered 25 percent-considerably below the 60-percent cost-of-living increase expected this year--and if they hold the line, it could be an important first step toward breaking the inflationary wage-price spiral.

The next few weeks will be critical for the government's wage policy, and labor agitation can be expected to increase because government employees' salaries will be frozen as of 1 November by a law forbidding raises during the year preceding national elections.


For the past year the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) has exercised restraint in order not to provide any right-wing group with an excuse for a coup. PCU policy now, however, appears to have changed and the party may feel compelled to agitate and prolong the strikes rather than see its influence and support in the unions diminish.



<u>USSR</u>: The Soviets may be deploying a new missile in some of the original surface-to-air missile sites around Moscow.

On 13 September	25X1DIA			
saw three two-stage mis-				
siles with bulbous, blue-colored noses at one of the				
SA-1 SAM sites which form a double ring around				
Moscow. The description of the missiles does not				
fit the Guild missile used at SA-1 sites.	\25X 1 DIA			
thought they were similar to the Griffon long-range				
missile which has been displayed in several military				
parades.				

Other sightings of Moscow SA-1 sites during the past two years have revealed modifications at many of them indicative of a changing or additional role. Large new electronic installations, possibly related to ballistic missile defense, have been seen at several sites on the outer ring. In addition, a number of SA-1 sites--including the one where the new missiles were observed--have had large revetments added.



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Congo (Leopoldville): Mercenary Colonel Hoare's two-pronged operation launched early this week against the rebel stronghold in the Fizi region is proceeding slowly. The larger force is moving overland north from Albertville while the other unit has moved up Lake Tanganyika and landed some 20 miles north

of Fizi at Baraka.

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(continued)

Yemen: Representatives of the various Yemeni political factions reportedly are to meet in Saudi Arabia during the next few days to help prepare for the scheduled November conference on an interim Yemeni Government. The meeting apparently is designed to widen support, particularly among those royalist tribal leaders who may wish to resume fighting, for the peace settlement agreed upon in August by Nasir and Saudi King Faysal. According to the royalist foreign minister, the factions will discuss plans to establish a new national party which he expects will form the basis of the new government.

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Colombia: The far-leftist renegade priest, Camilo Torres, is planning to hold an illegal rally in Bogota on 1 October, and several labor leaders have agreed to call a "general strike" on the same date. The authorities in Bogota refused to grant permission for the rally, which is automatically prohibited under the state of siege unless special permission is granted. Although a general strike is virtually impossible under the present circumstances, even a limited demonstration in Bogota could spark

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further widespread disorders.

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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